This Week in Say What?!

Among the many NBA trade deadline transactions is the release of veteran players who seek to play for title teams. Spurs veteran Michael Finley was one of the players granted his release, and promptly signed with the Celtics. This transaction was not interesting by itself; Finley was not playing in San Antonio, supplanted by younger, better players, and Boston has no such players populating its bench.

What was bizarre were the quotes that flowed from the story.

Henry Thomas, Finley’s agent: “I think the Spurs understood at the time not really being in the mix for the first time in his 15-year career," Thomas said. “They were very understanding of his situation and the fact he felt he still could contribute. [Not playing] was a difficult thing for him to handle.”

Even granting Thomas huge “agent-speak” leeway, this sentence is incomprehensible. San Antonio sits five games out from second place in the Western Conference, yet somehow the season is over? And at 31.7% shooting for the year, the only thing Finley will be contributing in Boston is money into his new teammates’ pockets, after losing game after game of HORSE after practice.

Thomas: “Unlike guys his age, normally it’s sort of a gradual thing, they move into the reality of being on teams and not being part of the mix. That wasn’t his experience.’’

One more thing: Isn’t Thomas supposed to be grateful that the Spurs granting Finley’s release, since it was technically a courtesy? What’s with all the passive-aggressive comments about the decline of the Spurs? It may be true, but since when is it ok for anyone other than Charles Barkley to speak the truth. In my mind, I had already read “Michael thanks the Spurs for the their professionalism, and looks forward to playing against them in the NBA Finals" before double-taking to Thomas' actual quote.

Gregg Popovich, Spurs coach: “I was very surprised, but we granted his request,” Spurs head coach Gregg Popovich said before the Spurs faced the Hornets in New Orleans last night. “That’s for other teams to decide if they think he can be useful. But we did grant him his release before the deadline so he would have the opportunity to play some place in the playoffs if he so desired.”

Popovich has a stronger reputation for bluntness, but his word choice still seems harsh, and equally passive-aggressive (Can Finley play? Well we couldn’t afford to play his washed-up ass and be competitive, but feel free to try your voodoo on him.) Given the timing of the two articles, I can imagine the Spurs’ brass was less than pleased to hear from Thomas that they were eliminated from the playoffs sometime last month.

NBA Deals and Acquisitions 101: Not your Daddy’s stock-in-trade

This NBA trading season made me excited, yet fearful. Every year, I cringe at the “Great trade! Who'd we get!” mentality of sports talk radio and webboards. This seems especially true in the NBA, where boom-bust cycles for teams are shorter than in the NFL and MLB, making for impatient fan bases. However, in light the realities of the NBA salary and talent development structures, I put forward an example of wheeling-and-dealing that required several years to marinate and come up to temperature.

The NBA’s closed system

As I mentioned, team building and management is a challenge in the NBA. Team brass are presented with a complicated payroll structure, involving salary floors, a “soft” salary cap, and a harder, but still malleable luxury tax. If this wasn’t enough, all of these flourishes of accounting finesse were designed in a much more prosperous era, when Stern & Co. only knew one direction for team revenues and player salary inflation. Add in grandfathered salaries from superstars of previous collective bargaining agreements, like those of Kevin Garnett and Shaquille O’Neal, and you have a superstar elite eligible for wages equal to 30-40% of a team’s total cap space, and not a penny less.

What you end up with is an largely incoherent system unable to properly value players that hit the open market, making trades less about achieving present equity than future flexibility. Clever GMs have taken huge PR hits for trading massive talents (with equally massive contracts) for players stashed abroad, rookies and draft picks. The de-facto swap of Pau Gasol for Marc Gasol and Zach Randolph has garnered significant attention as an example is this “BOOOOOOOOOOO…HURRAH!!!” paradigm, I think a more distant example shows the nuance involved in evaluating an NBA trade.

How “Seven Seconds” became several more years.

In the summer of 2005, Joe Johnson was not a happy camper. He felt low-balled by a Suns team he had helped put back on the map, and chafed in a role outside the limelight. Whether or not his anger would have been soothed by superstar money is debatable, but both sides eventually declared the marriage untenable. What ensued is often considered the beginning of “cheapskate” ownership tactics by Suns’ boss Robert Sarver: Johnson was traded for unproven vet Boris Diaw and two future first round picks.

In retrospect, this move helped the Suns prolong the Seven Seconds or Less era for several years to follow. Had the Suns retained Johnson at Atlanta’s offer (5 years, 70 million, with a “poison pill” in the form of a $20 million signing bonus up front), they would have likely filled out the roster around Johnson, Steve Nash, Shawn Marion and Amare Stoudemire with minimum salaried players, since Stoudemire had just inked a max deal, and Marion and Nash had been taken off the market by near-max deals in previous summers.

Instead, acquiring Diaw under a rookie contract gave the Suns some wiggle room. They signed Raja Bell to the full mid-level exception that summer, something they would not have done with a re-upped Johnson. Both he and Diaw were fine fits in the Suns up-tempo system. Bell provided defensive toughness and shooting without wasting many possessions, and Diaw gave the Suns a versatile forward option, especially when Stoudemire was sidelined with knee injuries. In 2009, as the Suns’ run in the Western Conference was clearly over, Diaw and Bell were flipped for Jason Richardson and Jared Dudley, younger alternatives at starting 2-guard and rotation forward who have flourished in the desert. When added to the bounty of the two draft picks – cap relief from Brian Grant’s guaranteed contract and cash considerations in 2006, and emerging center prospect Robin Lopez in 2008) – it looks as though critics of the current Suns administration need to look elsewhere for examples of managerial futility.

Final Thoughts

Of course, the extended transaction method of evaluation is rarely this clean. The main point here is that the NBA team building and management system has been forced by current conditions to be much more fluid and open than its professional sports brethren. Trades in basketball are rarely even swaps, or even today’s stars for tomorrow’s prospects. Instead, trades are made for flexibility, or by teams that have acquired flexibility. It is a system altered by upcoming negotiations between owners and players, but for now, makes for an interesting study in managerial behavior under artificial constraints.

*Don’t even get me started on largely failed developmental system – teams clearly don’t trust the D-League with their young players – that isn’t even as good as the model it replaced (the other CBA). Finally, at the beginning of this dysfunctional system is a draft which locks first-round picks into guaranteed contracts that teams on the edge of cap-imposed restrictions are loathe to accept.

In Focus: Andre Iguodala

AI2 is officially on the trade market, less than 18 months after being largely credited with the demise of the “no superstars” Pistons dynasty. Now, people are questioning his viability as a legitimate first or second option, as well as the wisdom of a contract contract that will likely pay him $60 million over the next 4 1/2 seasons. Given the varied opinions of AI2, it's probably a good idea to see who he is, and what worries teams should have about him going forward.

Player Analysis

As a scorer, Iguodala has always been limited by a inconsistent shooting stroke that has yet to improve. His career 46% rate on field goals is bolstered by a high rate of “inside” dunks and layups. Unfortunately, the addition of the original "AI," and the health of Elton Brand have added two players with high possession usage rates. On a team with a slow pace like the Sixers, this leads to a possession squeeze amongst top players. AI2 has been forced outside in 2009-10, playing to his biggest weakness. To be effective, AI2 needs to be on a higher pace team that can take advantage of his athleticism and fast-break potential.

Such a move would also help Iggy’s turnover problems. His rate of almost 15% for his career is well above normal for the typical wing player. An above average career assist % (19.3) mitigates this issue somewhat, but the benefits of his passing are not enough to make it worth having Iguodala initiate the offense regularly. Much like Trevor Ariza, AI2 is a better finisher than a playmaker, and is best used in this role.

The most surprisingly attribute of AI2 is his meager career rebounding (3.4% on the offensive glass and 14.5% on the defensive glass, for a grand total of 8.9%). You would think all of his plus athleticism would lead to a few more boards, or at least a higher career rate than Danny Granger or Josh Howard.

While AI2 has been effective drawing shooting fouls in the past, getting over 7 FTA per game in the 2006-07 season, these days Iguodala is averaging only 5 FTA per game. Over 40 minutes per game for a guy often with the ball in his hands, that’s not all that impressive. The reasons for this decrease mirror the reason for his increased reliance on jumpers: the presence of Iverson and Brand.

Beyond the four factors analysis, AI2 has significant value as a defensive stopper. Despite his average scoring and rebounding, Iguodala has consistently rated at the top of 82games production ratings for the 76ers, largely on the strength of holding the opposing player to a subpar PER.* These statistics work with what most NBA watchers see, which is a strong, long and tough athlete who does not give up anything easily, and who excels in the sort of lock-down defense that is more valuable than the misleading steals-and-blocks method of playing defense, like this guy has perfected.

Future Concerns

What do we make of the statistics outlined above? Are his dips in FG% and FTA, and corresponding increase in ill-advised 3P attempts just a fleeting consequence of trying to assimilate proud veterans, or are they indicative of a new trend. We can call that trend Vince Carter Syndrome; VCS afflicts talented, top-flight athletes who decide they have made too much money to be bothered with getting high percentage looks anymore.

Additionally, though AI2 just turned 26 two days ago, he has played 40 minutes per game and 80 games per year basically his entire 5 1/2 year career. As I mentioned above, Iguodala is not a guy that coasts all that much either. In this way, part of his value going forward is tied up in his outstanding durability and ability to bear down on lots of defensive possessions. How much longer can he do it? Either he is an injury risk going forward, or he will have to cut back the effort on one end. Both scenarios limit his value going forward.

At a macro level, any team trading for AI2 is going to want to know whether they want to be stuck with his big contract in an era when the NBA salary cap and luxury tax may continue to shrink. The presence of high-volume, low percentage chuckers (AI, Lou Williams, Willie Green) and big guys who don’t command double teams (Sam Dalembert, Reggie Evans, Marresse Speights, Brand) throughout AI2’s tenure makes it difficult to know what Iguodala would look like on a balanced roster run by competent management. Iguodala maintains an inconsistent reputation around the league, and is likely only a good fit on up-tempo teams that can forgive his shot selection, while reaping the benefits of his defense, athleticism, and growing passing acumen.

Final Verdict

Iguodala is a difficult player to get a read on going forward. With supbar rebounding numbers and declining field goal attempts close to the basketball, Iguodala seems a poor candidate for the “small 4” role that the Suns created for Shawn Marion to create mismatches. If he can improve his shooting, he will survive as a wing player with the ability to handle the ball and pass into his 30s. Otherwise, his value is tied up in defensive effort, which for wing players is often a younger man’s skill.

*82games.com actually uses a proprietary PER substitute that its operators suggest using as one would use PER.