Boston Celtics - Offseason Review

Opinions differ as to who deserves credit for masterminding the Celtics’ turnaround last year. Cynics say that Kevin McHale’s ineptitude and Kevin Garnett’s will to win were the main ignition behind the return to glory, and thus, that factors mostly out of Coach Doc Rivers and General Manager Danny Ainge’s hands conspired to create the 2007-2008 Celtics. Perhaps this is true, or perhaps the public read one too many of Bill Simmons’ columns. While I don’t have much to say about Rivers (except that as a coach of a veteran group, he largely stayed out of the way, and that might not be a bad thing), Ainge’s role in the Celtics’ reconstruction merits further review.

Ainge Would Be At Home In Vegas (Except that Mormons Don’t Gamble)

Specifically, Ainge’s draft strategy highlights an interesting core philosophy: high-risk, high-reward. Below is a chart of all the picks made or traded for on draft day by Ainge in his tenure as GM, with the pick number following:

2003: Troy Bell (16), Brandon Hunter (56)

2004: Al Jefferson (15), Delonte West (24), Tony Allen (25), Justin Reed (41)

2005: Gerald Green (18), Ryan Gomes (50), Orien Greene (53)

2006: Rajon Rondo (21), Leon Powe (49)

2007: Gabe Pruitt (32), Glen Davis (35)

2008: JR Giddens (30), Bill Walker (47), Semih Erden (60)

After a rocky start in 2003, Ainge seemed to find the correct formula, and/or gained enough control over the draft “war room” to apply said formula. Over the last 5 years, Ainge has mostly taken combo guards who would never be confused with “pure point guards” (West, Allen, Rondo, Pruitt, Greene), sleek athletes who lack polish, shooting and consistency in their games (Reed, Green, Giddens, Walker), and raw, unchiseled big men (Jefferson, Davis, Erden). Leon Powe stands out as posing a different kind of risk. Coming out of California, Powe had already undergone multiple reconstructive surgeries to his knees. Only Ryan Gomes really stands out, as he represents the polar opposite approach to drafting.

The Beating Drum of Productivity

Recently, some members of the basketball statistical community have embarked upon a not-so-subtle attempt to critique the drafting strategies of NBA teams. Notably, Wages of Wins has applied its central statistic, Wins Produced, to college statistics, in order to discover and promulgate the most productive college players. (See an example here: http://dberri.wordpress.com/2008/05/27/the-2008-nba-draft-preview) The logic that productive college players will become productive pros has considerable merit, and when you consider where how well Ryan Gomes played at Villanova, how low he was drafted, and his production in the NBA, it appears that there may exist something of a market inefficiency.

And its not just the stats community, folks. No less a TV talking head than Dick Vitale stands as the vanguard for players like JJ Redick and Adam Morrison, whose college productivity were matched only by a equally mediocre set of measurables and workout performances. One of the few interesting elements of ESPN’s otherwise nauseating coverage of the NBA Draft has been picking up on Dicky V’s unstated premise that college success is a huge indicator of pro success. As he clamored for teams to pick All-Americans before “one-and-dones,” Vitale evinced a spirit not dissimilar to that of the stats community (!).

So What?

In the face of this critique, several facts about the NBA should be mentioned in rebuttal:

1) Having a mass of above-average, productive talent is the surest way a team will avoid a deep playoff run. In recent years, only the 2003-2004 Detroit Pistons can reasonably say they eschewed the “all-star(s) surrounded by role players” model on the way to a title. Maybe this is just evidence of a copycat league, but it also supports the notion that, in a league with a very finite amount of difference makers, there is a huge premium on finding the next one. Given that NBA rosters require only 13 spots to be filled, teams are not going to waste their time developing young players with marginal upside.

2) Shane Battier and Carlos Boozer stand out as clear examples of what Wages of Wins is talking about: high college productivity correlating with high professional productivity, despite being drafted below players of much lower productivity at any level. However, a quick look through their stats shows that even Battier and Boozer were not close to playing their most productive basketball yet. The NBA is dissimilar to the NFL or MLB, where rookies routinely step in as difference-makers and league leaders. Perhaps because of officiating, perhaps because of the difference in the length of season, rarely do rookies even merit All-Star consideration. In this way, rookies are less valuable in basketball then in other major American professional sports.

3) Most importantly, the rookie salary rules are essentially set up to induce teams to take projects in the first round, and productive types in the second round. Why is that? First round picks have guaranteed contracts for the first two years of their career, which can be extended at the discretion of the team for an additional two years. The salary of all four possible years is dictated by a set scale, which most would agree is below the market rate for players with the abilities of most first round picks. Second round picks, however, are essentially little more than restricted free agents; teams drafting players in the second round are under no obligation to sign the drafted player, and when they do, may negotiate terms not subject to any scale.

What does this mean? As I see it, NBA teams have a strong incentive to control project players for four years by drafting them in the first round, much less than they do with players who may enter the pros at a higher productivity level, but with a lower ceiling. Such players are available in free agency every year, and teams the advantage of having a larger sample size for these veterans than they do for rookies. Additionally, the flexibility of the system is such that a team can cut bait if the player does not progress after two or three years. If the player does progress, they will have the first shot at signing the player to a second contract (which typically runs through the player’s prime), and even a second shot (by allowed the player to hit restricted free agency, and merely matching another team’s offer).

The Value of Young, Cheap, Controlled Talent

If monitored correctly, such a system allows a rebuilding team to build a core through the draft, take stock of how the players together, and keep that team together by signing the best of those players to long-term contracts through their prime. This was Boston’s approach. However, before the 2007-2008 season, the approach was not achieving results, and lead many to wonder if Ainge had invested his reputation in young players who might never gel, or who would gel long after he had gotten the axe.

That’s where the secondary value of his draft strategy comes into play: if Team A has 1) young, talented players, who are 2) locked into short-term contracts at reasonable rates, that 3) Team B will have a right of first refusal in retaining upon completion of the rookie contract, then Team A has some very nice trade commodities. Essentially, Ainge cashed in these commodities to obtain the veteran talent necessary to re-build the Celtics as a title contender. West and the high draft pick that became Jeff Green were the main pieces in the Ray Allen trade, while Jefferson was the main cog in the Kevin Garnett trade. This veteran talent meshed with Paul Pierce and the remaining young talent (Rondo, Allen, Perkins, Powe, Davis) to create the Celtics’ title team.